

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110017-9

Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110017-9

Secret



STAFF NOTES:

Soviet Union Eastern Europe

State Department review completed

Secret

25X1

25X1

1/1
November 25, 1975

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110017-9

Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110017-9

SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE



25X1

CONTENTS

November 25, 1975

| | |
|--|----|
| The Soviet Leadership. | 1 |
| USSR: Industry. | 6 |
| Ceausescu on the ECPC. | 8 |
| Ceausescu Postpones Kuwait Visit | 9 |
| Sino-Albanian Ties Appear Unchanged. | 10 |
| CHRONOLOGY | 11 |

The Soviet Leadership

The Soviet political elite, the party Central Committee, will meet on Monday to discuss next year's economic plan and budget and hear a report on leadership activity since the last plenum in April.


It is also expected to announce the agenda and speakers for the party congress next February, and it may make some changes in the positions of second-echelon leaders. Any of these would provide clues to leadership and policy decisions to be made at the Congress.

25X1

Aging Prompts Speculation

Most pre-Congress speculation has centered on the health of party chief Brezhnev and the question of whether or not he will stay in office.

25X1



These circumstances have encouraged East European officials and Soviet officials abroad to predict leadership changes before or at the Congress. The most frequent theme is that Brezhnev will retire or transfer to an honorary post.

25X1

Most reports carry no suggestion

25X1

November 25, 1975

-1-

25X1

of a coup or major policy conflict. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

The Shape of the Leadership

If change at the top is to be other than medically related and voluntary, what is the engine that will drive it? The senior leaders are not contenders for Brezhnev's job, and they probably identify their own security with keeping Brezhnev in place. Junior leaders who have long been waiting in the wings are still doing just that--waiting. Many are handicapped because they are poorly placed, lack a clear claim to a higher post, or have been ill. Those younger leaders who have shown impatience for power have already been weeded out.

In fact, the past year has reinforced the impression that if Brezhnev were to relinquish his post in the near future, Kirilenko would serve as an interim successor. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

November 25, 1975

25X1

25X1

25X1

Brezhnev Faces Disappointments

Recent events could give rise to misgivings over various policies. The glow has worn off the two major programs announced by Brezhnev at the last Party Congress: detente and consumer welfare.

In Soviet eyes, the value of detente probably seems somewhat obscured now by political losses in the Middle East, the aggressive response in the West to CSCE, and uncertainties over SALT and the Washington summit. This fall, Brezhnev has devoted attention to domestic matters and the communist movement, perhaps in an effort to mend fences before the Party Congress, perhaps in direct response to reported criticism of his preoccupation with detente.

This year's harvest failure will have a dispiriting effect politically and spotlights the failure to meet the goals of the consumer program. Brezhnev has already had to admit this failure to the Central Committee, and a debate over emphasizing the growth of consumer industries has surfaced in economic and party journals.

Other business is pending. The draft of the next five year plan must be completed soon. Drafting the fifteen year plan has evidently run into difficulty. Progress on other projects mentioned in the past by Brezhnev, including a new constitution and rationalization of agricultural and industrial management, looks even more problematical.

November 25, 1975

25X1

Despite these problems, the leadership seems willing to make adjustments in its basic policies without altering them fundamentally. Attractive alternatives to present policies have yet to be put forward with conviction.

The harvest disaster, for example, reflects poorly on the agricultural programs associated with Brezhnev, and politicians have already sought to head off criticism. In the end, however, the drought will probably be seen as an argument against abandoning the present heavy investments in agriculture and the development of the central Russian region. In addition, the drought makes the Soviet Union more dependent on grain imports from the West and, by extension, on detente--a dependency quietly given form in the recent five-year US-Soviet agreement on grain purchases.

Leadership Signals Awaited

The modest turnover in the membership of the Central Committee since the last Congress argues for stability at the top. No patterns have emerged in personnel changes that either strongly favored or detract from one or another leader. The series of party elections building up to the Congress are proceeding on schedule and in an unremarkable fashion.

The most telling indication of failure to prepare for succession is the absence of upward movement of junior members of the leadership. Recent additions to the Politburo have been older officials concerned with foreign policy who are not candidates for higher office. Meanwhile, full membership on the Politburo continues to be withheld from potential comers like RSFSR Premier Solomentsev. Other leadership posts, such as party secretary for culture and trade unions chief, have been left vacant.

The Outlook

The Soviet leadership seems to be coasting on past momentum and the strength of habitual forms that could carry it through the Congress with little

November 25, 1975

change. The need for a generational change is pressing; it is a growing factor for instability. As yet there is little evidence, however, of moves to unseat Brezhnev or other senior leaders or even of preparations for an orderly succession.

Deterioration in Brezhnev's health, of course, could at any time prompt a decision to retire or to assume an honorary post. He would be unlikely to retire strictly for political reasons. A voluntary decision, especially in favor of an interim succession under Kirilenko, might be made with little advanced warning and probably, in the short term, with a minimum of disruption to the leadership.

25X1

25X1

November 25, 1975

-5-

25X1

USSR: Industry

Soviet industrial production in the last year of the 1971-75 plan period will grow by more than 6.5 percent--only slightly below last year's healthy increase of nearly 7 percent. Industrial growth for the five year plan, however, will fall short of the target by about one fifth.

Effects on consumer industries of the 1975 harvest failure are as yet only slightly apparent. Hence, the boost in the overall level of consumption posted for the first nine months of 1975 will continue for the balance of the year. Although the growth rate in meat production for the final three months of 1975 will be below the 11 percent increase achieved through the third quarter, it will be high enough to sustain meat supplies. Also, because of tight livestock feed supplies, we do not expect the output of dairy products to be maintained at the third quarter growth rate of 4 percent.

The machinery sector, led by instruments and computers, is up 10 percent through the third quarter, although production of oil equipment, diesel locomotives, and freight cars is below last year's levels. A decline in the growth of agricultural machinery from a 4-year average of 12.5 percent to 9 percent this year coincided with the poor harvest. The Soviets must sustain unusually high growth rates in this sector because a large share of past production is perpetually out of service as a result of high breakdown rates, shortages of spare parts, and a lack of skilled mechanics.

Growth in output of most consumer durables is accelerating slightly this year. The troubled clothing and textile sector, however, is facing an accumulating inventory and is shifting emphasis to quality rather than quantity.

November 25, 1975

Most branches producing industrial materials have posted higher growth rates through September, with major increases in paper and paperboard, forest products, and chemicals. The improvement in paper production is significant because of the severe paper shortage of last year and early this year. Elsewhere in the materials sector, the failure of the ferrous metals branch to achieve the plan for rolled metals and steel pipe is adding to supply problems in some machinery branches.

25X1

November 25, 1975

25X1

Ceausescu on the ECPC

Romanian media still have not commented on last week's preparatory meeting in East Berlin for the proposed European Communist Party Conference (ECPC). A Turkish news interview with President Ceausescu just prior to the session was printed in the party daily *Scinteia* on November 23. In the absence of anything else, the interview can be taken as an authoritative statement of Bucharest's position.

The interview provides a candid view of the obstacles the Kremlin encountered when it tried to use the ECPC to re-establish Soviet authority over the European parties. Ceausescu emphasized the independence of all participating parties by characterizing the proposed gathering as an "exchange of views" and "a means by which all forces should act to implement the principles adopted at Helsinki." He also questioned the need for a final ECPC document, noting that if one is adopted, it should be by "general consensus."

The Romanian leader restated Bucharest's ground rules for participating in the conference--no guiding center for international communism, a free exchange of ideas, and recognition that each party must set its own line in accordance with the realities in which it exists.

The embassy notes that there could hardly be a more limp and diluted attitude toward ECPC and adds that it has rarely seen Soviet and East German diplomats "so defensive and ill at ease" in discussing the Berlin meeting. By contrast, the Yugoslavs have seldom been more outspoken in describing the "regression" of the ECPC preparations and in acknowledging the gap between the "independents" and "orthodox" parties.

25X1

November 25, 1975

25X1

Ceausescu Postpones Kuwait Visit

Romanian President Ceausescu has abruptly postponed the three-day visit to Kuwait that was scheduled to begin today. The stop in Kuwait was to precede a visit to Iran from November 27 to December 1. The Iranian visit will apparently still take place.

The Kuwaiti press speculates that Bucharest may have put off the visit because the Kuwait National Assembly failed--after four attempts--to ratify a bilateral trade agreement with Romania. The Assembly's debate centered on Romanian support for Israel in the UN, the fact that Romania was the only East European state that did not break relations with Israel in 1967, and Romania's failure to vote for the UN resolution equating Zionism with racism.

The Romanians have been successful in overcoming some of their problems with the more militantly anti-Israeli Arabs. They have, however, found it particularly difficult to convince the Kuwaitis of the merits of Bucharest's "balanced" Middle East policy. In an apparent effort to mollify Ceausescu, a spokesman for the Kuwait government has said that he will be welcome in his country at any time.

25X1

November 25, 1975

Sino-Albanian Ties Appear Unchanged

Western press speculation about strains in Sino-Albanian relations appears to be unfounded.

A lead editorial in *Zeri I Popullit*, the Albanian party's official paper, gave a ringing endorsement to Tirana's ties with Peking on November 23, the anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations. The paper noted that with China's aid, Albania "has built and is building a series of important projects for the national economy." The substance and tone of the editorial seem to lay to rest rumors that the Chinese have made any significant change in their aid commitment to the Albanians.

Tirana has reportedly just gone through a widespread personnel purge in a campaign against the growth of "bureaucracy." The extent to which the purge may have involved elements favoring better relations with Moscow is uncertain, but *Zeri I Popullit* left no stone unturned in striking out against all "revisionist enemies"--read, the Soviet Union and its supporters.

The same strident theme was taken up by Central Committee secretary and Politburo member Hysni Kapo in a recent address before the People's Assembly session, which is drafting a new constitution. Kapo asserted that the new constitution must endorse "a series of important revolutionizing measures" that the party has adopted to "uproot the evil of bureaucratism and liberalism."

25X1

November 25, 1975

25X1

CHRONOLOGY

November 18 Italian President Leone begins a week-long state visit to the USSR and meets with President Podgorny.

25X1

Czechoslovak party/state leader Husak confers with visiting Soviet Defense Minister Grechko.

25X1

Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Grishin arrives in Cairo for an official visit concerning debt rescheduling and other aspects of Soviet-Egyptian economic relations.

25X1

North Vietnamese party chief Le Duan commences a four-day stopover in Moscow en route home from Romania.

25X1

Warsaw Pact defense ministers begin a two-day meeting in Prague.

25X1

Italian and French Communist parties issue a joint statement repudiating "all foreign interference" in the domestic affairs of their nations.

25X1

November 19 The "editorial commission" making preparations for the European Communist party conference completes a three-day meeting in East Berlin; the participants defer until at least January of 1976 any agreement on the final text and dates of the conference.

25X1

Brezhnev confers with visiting Italian President Leone, who also

November 25, 1975

25X1

25X1

November 19 has a meeting with Premier Kosygin
and a second one with President
Podgorny. [REDACTED]

25X1

SALT negotiators have a two-hour
meeting at Geneva and agree to
reconvene in two weeks; US negotiator
Johnson will return to Washington
"for routine consultations." [REDACTED]

25X1

The unmanned Soviet Soyuz-20 spacecraft
docks with the Salyut-4 orbital station.

25X1

[REDACTED]
Portuguese Communist party chief
Cunhal concludes a three-day visit
to Poland and goes to East Berlin,
where he is feted at a dinner hosted
by East German party chief Honecker.

25X1

November 20 French Foreign Trade Minister
Segard begins an official visit to
the USSR for talks on energy matters.

25X1

[REDACTED]
GDR Premier Sindermann completes a
four-day, official visit to Iran.

25X1

[REDACTED]
Soviet embassy in Washington formally
protests "Zionist" harassment of
Soviet facilities in the US. [REDACTED]

25X1

Czechoslovak party's Central Committee
convenes in Prague to discuss eco-
nomic plans for 1976. [REDACTED]

25X1

Romania's Grand National Assembly
convenes in Bucharest. [REDACTED]

25X1

Polish party's Central Committee
convenes for a plenary meeting in
Warsaw. [REDACTED]

25X1

November 25, 1975

25X1

25X1

November 20 Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Chnoupek completes a four-day official visit to The Netherlands, the first in bilateral relations since the formation of the Czechoslovak state in 1919. [REDACTED]

25X1

November 21 Politburo member Suslov observes his 73rd birthday. [REDACTED]

25X1

A conference of the Communist-front World Peace Council opens in Leningrad and awards Brezhnev its "gold medal of peace." [REDACTED]

25X1

South Yemeni Foreign Minister Muti returns home from Moscow. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

November 22 Mongolian Foreign Minister Rinchin concludes a six-day official visit to India. [REDACTED]

25X1

Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev ends a two-day visit to Prague, where he signed a trade agreement for 1976-1980. [REDACTED]

Syrian Communist party chief Bakdash concludes a one-week official visit to Hungary. [REDACTED]

25X1

USSR and Cuba sign in Moscow an agreement on cooperation in developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. [REDACTED]

November 25, 1975

25X1

25X1

November 22 Soviet-Egyptian debt rescheduling
talks commence in Cairo. [REDACTED]

25X1

Romanian Foreign Trade Minister
Patan begins an official visit to
Iran. [REDACTED]

25X1

USS *Bigelow* concludes a six-day,
official port call at Rijeka,
Yugoslavia. [REDACTED]

25X1

November 23 Secretary of Agriculture Butz begins
a brief official visit to Romania.
[REDACTED]

25X1

November 24 Bulgarian party/state leader Zhivkov
starts a five-day visit to West
Germany. [REDACTED]

25X1

Soviet-Norwegian Barents Sea con-
tinental shelf talks resume in Oslo.
[REDACTED]

25X1

Hungarian President Losonczi begins
a four-day state visit to Libya; he
will then go on to Tunisia for three
days. [REDACTED]

25X1

Italian President Leone completes
his state visit to the USSR. [REDACTED]

25X1

PLO Chairman Arafat begins a visit to
the USSR. [REDACTED]

25X1

Romanian-Iranian economic coopera-
tion negotiations commence in
Teheran. [REDACTED]

25X1

November 25 Polish Foreign Trade Minister
Olszewski commences a five-day
official visit to Egypt. [REDACTED]

25X1

November 25, 1975

25X1

25X1

November 25 Secretary of Agriculture Butz begins a four-day official visit to Poland.

25X1

[REDACTED]
Czechoslovak party-state leader Husak arrives in Moscow on an official visit and is met by the top three Soviet leaders. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

FUTURE EVENTS

November 26 US and Soviet representatives to convene in Washington for bilateral talks on Law of the Sea issues. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

November 27 Romanian President Ceausescu to commence a five-day state visit to Iran. [REDACTED]

25X1

late November Yugoslav Foreign Minister Minic to make an official visit to The Netherlands. [REDACTED]

25X1

USSR to launch a satellite containing US biological experiments. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

November 25, 1975

25X1

25X1

| | | |
|----------------|--|------|
| December 1 | CPSU Central Committee expected to convene in Moscow for a plenary meeting. [REDACTED] | 25X1 |
| | Turkish Prime Minister Demirel to begin a three-day official visit to Bulgaria. [REDACTED] | 25X1 |
| December 2 | USSR Supreme Soviet to convene in Moscow. [REDACTED] | 25X1 |
| | Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sabah to begin an official visit to the USSR. [REDACTED] | 25X1 |
| December 3 | Bulgarian parliament to convene. [REDACTED] | 25X1 |
| December 4 | West German Foreign Minister Genscher to begin a two-day official visit to Romania. [REDACTED] | 25X1 |
| early December | US-Soviet committee on nuclear energy cooperation to convene in Washington. [REDACTED] | 25X1 |
| December 8 | Yugoslav Foreign Minister Minic to begin a two-day official visit to the USSR. [REDACTED] | 25X1 |
| | Polish party congress to convene in Warsaw; party chief Gierek will deliver the keynote speech. [REDACTED] | 25X1 |
| December 10 | Nobel Peace Prize to be awarded--undoubtedly <i>in absentia</i> --to Sakharov at Oslo; Soviet economist-mathematician Kantorovich to receive his Nobel prize in economics at Stockholm. [REDACTED] | 25X1 |
| December | Romanian party secretary Andrei to make an official visit to Israel. [REDACTED] | 25X1 |

November 25, 1975

25X1

25X1

25X1

mid-December A "working group" to convene in
East Berlin for further work on the
draft of the final document for the
proposed pan-European Communist
party conference.

25X1

25X1

December 19 Brezhnev to mark his 69th birthday.

25X1

November 25, 1975

25X1